HOW THE TURKISH MEDIA SEE THE COUP D’ÉTAT IN EGYPT IN 2013: A SURVEY ON RADİKAL AND STAR NEWSPAPERS

TÜRK MEDYASI 2013 YILINDA MISIR’DA YAŞANAN DARBEYİ NASIL GÖRMEKTEDİR: RADİKAL VE STAR GAZETELERİ ÜZERİNDEN BİR ARAŞTIRMA

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Abstract: Egypt’s first elected president Mohamed Morsi removed from power by the Egyptian army chief General al-Sisi on July 3rd, 2013. The army also suspended the constitution of Egypt. This military coup received different international reactions from Arab and Western leaders, Middle Eastern governments and also the United States. Turkish government strongly condemned the military’s actions and removal of Morsi and expressed concern over the violation of the democratic choice of Egyptian people. However, it does not mean Turkey has a unique voice against this military coup. Unlike the government, opposition party leaders did not describe the events in Egypt as a coup d’état or gave some neutral or measured response to the Egyptian army’s actions. Similarly, there were diverse reactions from different media groups to the events in Egypt. This work will try to analyze the different arguments emerging from the media in Turkey regarding the events in Egypt by surveying the two newspapers in Turkey. By examining the news texts and columns in Radikal and Star newspapers, it will be analyzed why the events in Egypt perceived in such a contradictory ways by the media and how the differences in the opinions of the media have shaped public opinion.

Key Words: Coup D’etat in Egypt, Turkish Press, Radical, Star

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1. INTRODUCTION

It is the fact that Egypt has witnessed the overthrow of two presidents since the start of the Arab Spring in 2011, Mubarak and Morsi. The former was forced to resign by the millions of protestors on the streets and the latter was removed from his democratically held post by a military coup d’état. The revolution which came after calls by millions of protestors for an end to corruption, injustice, poor economic conditions and also the 30-year-old autocratic Mubarak regime was ceased with military intervention by a coalition led by the Egyptian army chief General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Egypt has experienced a very catastrophic period from a revolution to a military coup d’état only in two years.

There were mixed international reactions to the military coup d’état. Most Arab and Western leaders were generally supportive or neutral. However, Qatar and Tunisia strongly condemned the actions by Egyptian military forces (Joffe, 2011: 509). Some other states also condemned or expressed their concern over the removal of Morsi. Turkey was among these countries. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in his closing speech of TÜBİTAK Congress for Turkish Scientists Living Abroad said: “No matter where and against whom they occur, coups are always bad. Coups are obviously enemies of people, their future and democracy. He also strongly criticized the West for not naming the actions in Egypt as a coup and said “The West has failed the sincerity test. A coup is never being democratic. It is unnatural and also absurd.” (“Batı Mısır’daki Olaya…”, 05.07.2013).

The debates have been not restricted to the politicians’ disclosures. There has also been a hot debate in the media on the subject of naming these events. It has been described by some Western media as a coup or as another revolution by proponents. There have been various media reports and columns debating as to whether events are best labeled as being a coup or not. The situation in Turkish media is not much more different than the Western ones in terms of split in opinion towards military actions in Egypt. There were plenty of media reports and news go along with the opinions of the Turkish government by strongly criticizing the military actions and labeled it as a coup, while many others saw the military actions inevitable for the sake of democracy in Egypt.

To illustrate the differences in Turkish media’s approach to military action in Egypt in July 2013, it will be analyzed the news and the ideas of columnist published in two important newspapers of Turkey, Star and Radikal. Why these two newspapers chosen is that these are the ones clearly representing two different approaches towards the military action in Egypt. These two different approaches will be evaluated in terms of their differentiating opinions concerning the labeling of military actions and their causes. However, a study of all the news and columns
published in both newspapers throughout July 2013 will start short background information explaining what happened between 25 January 2011 and 3 July 2013.

2. EGYPT FROM REVOLUTION to COUP D’ETAT

Throughout 2011, a harmonic voice echoed across the Arab countries (Spingel, 2011:1, Ajami, 2012): “The people want to overthrow the regimes.” This voice easily crossed the borders carrying by newspapers and magazines, on Twitter and Facebook. Young people’s uprisings against autocratic leaders in search of political freedom and economic opportunity looked like a pan-Arab awakening. In December, a despairing Tunisian fruit vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest the injustices of the status quo (Karatzogianni, 2015: 92-93). Soon, millions of people poured into the streets.

Inspired by the events in Tunisia, Egyptians get together to protest on January 25 by calling for an end to corruption, injustice, poor economic conditions, and they also intended to end the 30-year-old regime of President Hosni Mubarak. Street demonstrations rapidly turned into a national revolutionary movement which resulted in removal of Mubarak and his National Democratic Party (NDP) from power in 18 days only (“The January 25 Revolution”).

In the beginning of the uprising, mass demonstrations in Cairo, Alexandria and other cities, and the occupation of Cairo’s central Tahrir (Liberation) Square were met with repression and violence of the police and also supporters of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). On January 27, the government cut off the Internet and mobile services. Still the uprising continued in spite of Mubarak’s weak concessions like appointing intelligence Omar Suleiman as vice president, installing a new cabinet, accepting that neither himself nor his son would run for being. However, Mubarak failed to conciliate the Egyptian people. On February 11, a day of massive demonstrations, Mubarak was finally forced to resign. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) headed by Tantawi took the control of Egypt and later suspended the constitution (“The January 25 Revolution”).

Following Mubarak’s resignation, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took over the presidential powers (Karlsson, 2012: 96). Parliamentary elections in 2011-12 resulted in a decisive victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and Salafist al-Nour party. When Freedom and Justice Party and al-Nour Party held the overwhelming majority in the parliament (“Arab Uprising: Country by Country”), the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces stayed calm. Settled Egyptian regime didn’t take the parliament seriously. The most important issue was the presidency (“Egypt From revolution…”, 04.07.2013).
In June 2012, the Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi was elected president. Holding the power after nearly 30 years Mubarak rule, Mohamed Morsi became the 5th president of Egypt and it was the first civilian leader of his country. However, he swiftly revoked a controversial SCAF decree that limited his powers, dissolved the House of Representatives and changed the military’s leadership, naming Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi as chief of staff and defense minister. In an answer to this soft coup, Morsi has recently issued a new constitutional declaration. However, public opposition to Morsi began to build in November 2012, when he issued a decree granting himself far-reaching powers, and were fuelled by the passage of what many considered an Islamist-leaning draft constitution.

On 3rd of July 2013, a coalition led by the Egyptian army chief General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi removed the President of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, from power and suspended the Egyptian constitution, as a conscious response to Egyptian protesters who demanded the end of Morsi’s administration and the initiation of early presidential elections. The move came after four days widespread national protests against the administration and an ultimatum by the military for the government (“Egypt Protests: Army Issues…”, 01.07.2013): ‘to provide reconciliation and “resolve its differences” with opponents within 48 hours or face the implementation of a military “road map” for reforms’. The coalition declared Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, Adly Mansour as the interim president of Egypt. Morsi was put under house arrest and several Muslim Brotherhood leaders were arrested. The announcement was followed by demonstrations and clashes between supporters and opponents of the move throughout Egypt. After Morsi was deposed by the military, millions of protesters took to the streets and replaced by an interim government.

In his televised statement (Karoi, 07.07.2013); “General Fattah al-Sisi noted the armed forces were adhering to their civil responsibility and not looking to move power. Flanked by opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei and the Coptic Pope, the General unveiled their road map which included suspending the constitution, putting the chief justice in charge, calling for early elections, setting up an interim technocrat government, and forming a committee to amend the constitution”.

Egypt is polarized between supporters of the interim government and the military on the one-hand, and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and those who fear the authorities have become too repressive on the other. Security forces launched a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, killing almost 1,000 people at two pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo (“Egypt Security Forces…”, 19.09.2013).

In December 2013, a constituent assembly finished drafting a new constitution to replace the 2012 charter (“Arab Uprising: Country by Country”).
A referendum was held on the redrafted constitution, followed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 2014. The referendum in which a 90%+ “yes” (“The Arab Spring… “, 16.01.2014) vote validated the army-led coup that ousted the first elected president, Mohamed Morsi.

3. DIFFERENTIATING IDEAS on THE CAUSES of MILITARY COUP

There are massive problems in front of Egypt’s leaders after Mubarak’s overthrow like the issues concerning education, social welfare, intelligence, and peace with Israel, the military ties to the United States, and also energy shortages, lack of security, diplomatic crises and retention of the officer corps’ economic privileges. A year-long rule of Morsi is too short to cope with this long list of problems but the removal of Morsi from his post through a military coup following the demonstrations often justified with the severe problems that Egypt faced during Morsi rule. Even if Radikal and Star newspapers address some common problems under Morsi rule, they have different opinions on the background and causes lead up to military coup.

Radikal Newspaper

Some of the articles published in Radikal Newspaper mainly focus on the autocratic inclinations of Morsi rule as a primary reason for the unrest gave way to protests against Morsi rule and the military intervention at the last stage. According to Murat Yetkin (“Mısır, İhvanlaştırmaya…”, 02.07.2013) the social unrest against Morsi rule is related with political reasons rather than the economic issues. Yetkin says that just after he held the presidency, Morsi took the step in the way of increasing his authorities including the ones over judiciary aiming at lowering democratic control over his rule. Although he had to step back on this issue, he continued to grant all posts of the state to İhwan members including the criminals. The events in the city of Luxor already set out as a reaction to the assignment of a criminal İhwan member to the governorship. In addition, Yetkin asserts that the Morsi government put more pressure on non-Muslims and women.

An article published in Radikal 2 (“Büttünüyle Gayrimeshero…”), a supplement of Radikal Newspaper; on 7th July 2014 also focus on the autocratic inclinations of Morsi rule. The article underlines the considerably poor management of Morsi and the government and also claims that the main mistake was their attempt to establish a conservative-despotic rule in collaboration with the army while military tutelage was still in force.

According to this article Morsi’s policies was not only unsuccessful but also shortsighted. They have pursued an incompetent and greedy policy by overestimating their own power and disregarding the transformation of the Egyptian people and also being unable to perceive the social mechanisms of demonstrations which overthrew old power holders. Furthermore, the article settles his attempt to take over the legislative power after
the parliament was abolished by the Supreme Constitutional Court as the worst mistake made by Morsi. Meanwhile, he has totally confined himself to the political tradition he came from and lost even the support of other Muslim parties and organizations. According to this article, he could not realize that he would have to hand over all his power bureaucratic elites. Hence, at the end Morsi was also overthrew on 3rd July 2013 and the state bureaucracy and bureaucratic elites fully seized the power.

Additionally; Koray Çalışkan in his column (“Mursi Göreve İade Edilmeli”) dated on 9th of July 2014 lists the “democratic sins” of Morsi by quoting from the historian Khaled Fahmy. Firstly, the Ihwan assumed that they have right to do whatever they want as they received 51% of the electorate voted. Secondly, Morsi attempted to suppress media and judiciary, instead of bringing illegal actions of the police to the justice. Also, whenever he confronted a serious problem instantly condemned opposition parties or foreign powers. Additionally, he insulted each opponent by calling them “felool” which refers the remnants of the Mubarak regime’s proponents. Moreover, he has tried to take the control of judiciary and the Supreme Constitutional Court by through early retirement of 3000 judges. Lastly, by the Ihwanization of the state mechanism, Morsi gave way to polarization of Egyptian society.

It is the fact that a constitutional referendum was held in Egypt in two rounds on 15th and 22nd of December 2012. Voters were asked whether they approve of the draft constitution that was accepted by the Constituent Assembly on 30th November 2012. Even it was approved by 64% of Egyptians who voted; only about 30% of Egyptians having the right to vote participated in the referendum process. According to Koray Çalışkan Morsi disregarded the boycott by the people against this referendum and latch on to Egyptian people through his narrow-minded will. Çalışkan also asserts that Morsi strived to impose a simple radical Islamist mentality upon Egyptian society having a complicated structure. Çalışkan argue that Ihwan has broken the ties with the people apart from its own members, turned a deaf ear to the voice of opposition parties and all their supporters and also established antidemocratic and fanatic rule.

**Star Newspaper**

It is not very surprising to see different perceptions of the reasons behind the military coup by the columnists and reporters of *Star Newspaper*. Beril Dedeoğlu, in her article (“Mısır: Gelecek Örneği”) dated on 3rd of July 2013, states that Morsi gave a central position only some of the opposition groups enacted on June 25 revolution and disregarded some others while he was establishing his policies. Similar with the ideas expressed by *Radikal* columnists, Dedeoğlu states that some of the opposition began to feel excluded from the administration of the state though they shouldered important responsibilities in overthrow...
of Mubarak regime. That’s why they hesitated to support Morsi during the military interventions. This was one of the important problems that Morsi encountered. Another problem was the way of relationship Morsi established with the army. He should make a choice between providing the support by the army or stand against them. Her article published just a few hours earlier the military coup on July 3 concludes that to try to provide the support of army is very risky and it seems that the army monopolize Morsi rule and somewhat encompasses against him.

Similarly Nasuhi Güngör, in his article (“Türkiye ve Mısır’ın Kaderi”) dated on 4th of July 2014, defines the military coup a local and international conspiracy. He accepts the military coup in Egypt an organized plan for removing Morsi rule under the cover of claiming their rights against the oppression. According to him, this plan has two goals; to cut off the support by large masses to Morsi by the way of manipulations repeatedly referring his failure just after a single year and to break off the relations between Muslim Brothers and other Islamist groups by facilitating from these manipulations.

In addition; Halime Kökçe (“Ne Mursi Ne Oldu…”, 04.07.2013) rejects the idea assuming that the economic crisis was one of the most important reasons for the social unrest and demonstrations against Morsi. She thinks that the masses on the streets on 30th of June 2014 did not intend to protest economic depression. As a matter of fact, the people on the streets actually were not the ones who directly suffered from economic crisis. She underlines that the lower classes of Egyptian society are mostly composed of Muslim Brothers and Salafists which were already the supporters of Morsi. Up to her, the people who came together at Tahrir on June 30 and welcomed the intervention by the Egyptian army forces were not these people. She adds that although the settled watchdog institutions of old regime and also the mechanisms of political tutelage were still running, the people on the street legitimizing the military coup as the sole remedy for the solution of problems have never hesitate to accuse Morsi of being antidemocratic.

The columnists in Star Newspaper often remind the army’s roots reach deep into Egypt’s economy. As a large network of businesses, the military has become a kind of “a ‘quasi-commercial’ enterprise” (The Egyptian Army’s Economic…”, 05.08.2013). It runs hospitals, builds roads, manages resorts and owns factories that produce fertilizers, cement and even cars. It employs tens of thousands of civilians and nearly half a million soldiers, often conscripts, meaning almost every family with a son has a military connection. In the aftermath of the coup, one poll found, 70% of Egyptians retained confidence in it (“The Arab Spring…”, 16.01.2014). That’s why Cemil Ertem (“Mısır-Türkiye-Batı…”, 05.07.2013) claims that Egyptian army undoubtedly is not an organization responsible for national security
against the enemies outside. According to him, Egyptian army is actually an interior economic and political mechanism controlling and regulating the colonial relations between Egypt and the West. The Egyptian military forces not only directly control 20% of total Egyptian economy but also manage the capitalists in leading sectors through its armed bureaucracy. That’s why the army does not want to share its sovereignty with any alternative power groups and loose its central position in the policy and economy of Egypt.

Additionally, there are many journalists and academicians in *Star* Newspaper who strongly criticize some other journalists and analysts who often giving a list of mistakes by Morsi himself and the people around him. They do not find acceptable the way of legitimizing military coup through various mistakes of Mursi rule. Being among these journalists Ahmet Kekeç (“Mursi Nerede Hata Yaptı?”, 09.07.2013) voices some counter arguments against the analysts overemphasizing some mistakes of Morsi rule. While Ahmet Kekeç evaluating the situation in which Morsi stand, he use the following statements: Morsi is a President whose authority was mostly restricted. On the other hand, he always ill-treated by the remnants of old regime and also his authority to appointment was severely tied up. Moreover, he has not a real army. The army has maintained its pivotal position in Egypt’s political and economic life and it did not seem to be willing to share its hegemony the elected President.

Furthermore, Morsi was deprived of the support from intelligence services. Top it all, the police out of his control and was in cooperation with the other camp. Media did not give up its bad habits inherited from Mubarak regime. Salafist withdrew their supports and also bureaucrats persistently boycotted Morsi.

Although, he was put under such a big pressure, media and opponents expected Morsi to solve 100-year-old problems, to provide the revival of economy, to eliminate unemployment, to improve distribution of income, not to touch upon the privileges of soldiers, bureaucrats and Mubarak proponents. Opposing parties expected Morsi to solve all these severe problems in a single year and attempted to make a military coup by assuming that he could not resolve all these rooted problems that could not be eliminated Nasr, Enver Sadat or Mubarak. Kekeç states that although some analysts know very well all the reality regarding the demands of Morsi opponents, they insistently ask some questions like; What did he do wrong?, Why he did not accept his own mistakes. According to him, there are many journalists and analysts in Turkish media behave in such an insincere and biased way.

4.DEBATES OVER LABELING the MILITARY ACTIONS in EGYPT

There are various media reports and columns in both newspapers debating as to whether events in Egypt in July 2013 are best labeled as being
a coup or not. Although both newspapers use the term “military coup” for describing the military interventions in Egypt in July 2013 and principally stand against the military coups, some of the columnists in Radikal Newspaper add various annotations, which mainly focus on big mistakes of Morsi rule, paved the way for the coup d’état. On the other hand, Star adopts a very clear attitude towards military coup and rejected all kind of military interventions whatever the reason.

Radikal Newspaper

Cengiz Çandar (“Müslüman Kardeşlerin …”, 04.07.2013) in his article on the Radikal Newspaper agree that a government that came into office through democratic elections should not be dissolved through anti-democratic methods, while he asserts that Muslim Brothers experience in Egypt explicitly failed. By disregarding the question that toppling of a government that come into force through democratic elections by a method that are not legal- actually through a military coup- can be treated an unsuccessfulness or not, Çandar asks that just after a single year how the leader of Muslim Brothers who was elected by the majority of the Egyptians on 30th of June 2011 has become the target for the greatest demonstrations of Egyptian history. Çandar asserts that Cairo witnessed the largest mass demonstrations ever held throughout the world history on 30th of June 2013 and Tahrir demonstrators who overthrew the Mubarak regime were also among these masses. Hence, it is unnecessary to mention about a ‘military coup’ or ‘advocates of old regime’ he said. He additionally argues that being opposed to any military coups should not prevent anyone to take long reaching “political” lessons from the failure of Muslim Brother experience in Egyptians.

In another article by him in Radikal Newspaper dated on 5th of July 2014, Çandar (“Mısır: Ya Devrim Ya Darbe”) discusses again how we should term the military actions in Egypt. He emphasizes that it is not acceptable to legitimize any kind of military coup and he also points out that the one in July 2013 is unquestionably a military coup. However, he underlines that people have to go beyond the terminology that used for military coup and seek for answering the question that why it happened. Çandar makes a comparison between January 25 and June 30 and argues that if people describe the January 25 as a “revolution” which overthrew the rule of last Pharaoh and lead way to Muslim Brother rule by elections, on the other hand it is necessary to entitle the events on June 30 hitting the streets with 30 million people which two times more crowded than January 25. “Morsi was toppled after the demonstrations carried out by millions of people which double crowded than the ones put Morsi into power” said Çandar and asked why someone do not term June 30 also a revolution and why insist on describing the military intervention following the mass demonstration by 30 million people as a military coup headed by
General Abdülfettah el-Sisi. Çandar asserts that the developments, which paved the way for the Muslim Brothers rule after 25 June took place thanks to the actions of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces which took over the government from Mubarak. Additionally he asks “Then, why it is not appropriate to name 25 January a coup d’état headed by Genral Tantawi”. Answering his own question, Çandar states that it is not appropriate because Morsi was democratically elected. However, he claims that election is a basis for legitimization but not a guarantee for hindering the establishment of an autocratic regime.

Then, Çandar thinks that secularist dictatorship of Mubarak replaced with Islamist dictatorship.

**Star Newspaper**

The military coup after the demonstrations of masses on the Cairo streets was interpreted in many different ways both in Turkey and all over the world. Some people did not recognized these events as a military coup despite of all clear signs of it and insistently avoid from describing what was going on. All of the columnists and journalists in Star Newspaper speak with a single voice about labeling the actions of Egyptian military forces in July 2013. They, unconditionally and without any reserve, used the term “coup” what did in July 2013. There are numerous news reports and articles about labeling the military coup in Egypt but only a few of them might be mentioned in this study, which may provide us a general idea about the approach of Star Newspaper.

“No matter what they say and no matter they abstain from, what happened in Egypt was a military coup.” said Mensur Akgün in his article (“Darbe miydi?”, 06.07.2013) published in Star Newspaper. Moreover, he claims that the military coup was not enacted on 3rd of July 2014, it is already completed when Abdel Fattah el-Sisi sent 48hour ultimatum of the Egyptian Armed Forces.

Sisi gave the President to reach an agreement with the opposition partiers. According to Star writers and columnists, wherever it is occurred or whatever the reason, such kind of an intervention is unquestionably a military coup. No reason lies behind can legitimize a military coup. Also, a military coup cannot be justified by pointing out that the majority of the people gave support to the military coup and by making a televised announcement together with the Grand Sheikh of Al Azhar Ahmed el-Tayeb, the Coptic Orthodox Pope Tawadros II, opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei as well as other religious group. It might help in legitimizing the coup in the eyes of pro-coups but this kind of intervention never has a democratic legitimacy.

Fehmi Koru (“Hep Beraber Söyleyelim…”, 06.07.2013) strongly criticizes analysts and journalists asking whether the one in July 2013 was a military coup or not. He states that the Western analysts who intend to express their ideas on the events in Egypt, the journalists preparing the headlines of their newspapers and some opinion leaders deliberatively and insistently avoid using...
the word “coup”. Without using the term military coup, these people try to explain the events in Egypt through means of vague statements. According to Koru, the Westerners support military coup in being such a manner.

In another article by Fehmi Koru, it is underlined again that no ifs and buts what happened in Egypt in July 2013 was a military coup. The intervention by the armed forces in democratic rule, the suspension of the constitution and also removal of all elected post are always recognized as a military coup whatever the conditions. He argues that even if they assign a civilian to the presidency and declare a dictated text as Egypt’s new constitution, they can never legitimize their “democratic” coup.

5. CONCLUSION

It is the fact there are many different factors shaping the general approach of a media organization towards people, events and news. Ideological and political tendencies of journalists and reporters, ownership structure of the media company and also the forms of relationship between the media companies and both political and economic circles are all significant aspects creating the overall ideological and political atmosphere within a media organization. Additionally, the characteristics of relationship between media organizations and political parties whether the ruling or opposition ones and also general opinion of a media company on the previous actions of government or opposition parties mainly influence a media company’s point of view about new developments. When the general approach of Radikal and Star Newspapers towards the military coup in Egypt on 3rd of July 2013, it is not surprising that all these factors have some effects on the content of many articles and also on the ideas expressed in both newspapers.

Star and Radikal Newspapers has been chosen as the subjects of this research. While the former is supposed to be a branch of a pro-government media group, the latter is assumed to be a part of anti-government media conglomerate. The analysis of the news and articles throughout July 2013 in both newspapers shows that their overall political position affects their point of view on military coup in Egypt on 3rd of July 2013.

The research on both newspapers, it is clear that journalists and columnists of both newspapers principally stand against any kind of military intervention in a democratic system and also label the actions of Egyptian military forces in July 2014 and afterwards as coup d’état. Although, most of the columnists of Radikal Newspaper agree that removal of a government that came into office through democratic elections through a military coup is unacceptable, their statements often followed by some “buts”. They mainly focus on some reasons behind the coup including especially maladministration under Morsi rule and his autocratic inclinations. They pay little attention to other problems like economic issues,
energy shortages, lack of security and diplomatic crises. The assumed conservative-despotic inclinations of Morsi rule were overemphasized by Radikal journalists and columnists. They assert that election is a basis for legitimization but not a guarantee against the establishment of a despotic regime. According to Radikal columnists’ secularist dictatorship of Mubarak replaced with Islamist dictatorship of Morsi.

Additionally, while most of Radikal columnists principally term the actions of Egyptian military forces on July 3 and afterwards as a military coup, at the same time they question why it is not possible to term June 30 also a revolution and why it is necessary to insist on describing the military intervention following the mass demonstration by 30 million people as a military coup headed by General Abdülfettah el-Sisi. They underline that on June 30 there were 30 million people on the streets which two times more crowded than demonstrations until January 25.

Another common idea revealed by Radikal columnists is that by making a coup, the military forces of Egypt not only deposed the first democratically elected President of Egypt but also take away the any possible opportunity at the hands of opponents to stop Morsi’s despotic actions in a democratic way.

On the other hand, the articles and news reports in Star Newspaper strongly criticize unresponsiveness of the Western countries concerning the military coup in Egypt. Similarly, there is much news in Star about the members of opponent parties in Turkey who is supportive or neutral. The ones who are neutral or supportive to the military coup often try legitimizing the military coup by giving the list of the sins of Morsi and the people around him. For Star analysts and columnists, it is unacceptable way of legitimizing military coup. Star Newspaper seems to be adopted a very sharp attitude towards military coup and rejected all kind of military interventions whatever the reason. The Turkish government’s opposition to the occurrences in Egypt, defending the rights of those elected, declaring its sympathy to those who condemn the coup in an “ethical” manner very clearly reflected on the opinions of Star writers and columnists. They underline that what’s going on in Egypt is a coup d’état in most primitive and harsh sense of meaning and no reason, explanation, and failure of the government could justify that.

Hence, according to writers and columnists of the Star Newspaper, none of the severe problems often pronounced by the supporters of the military coup is new; on the contrary they are all rooted ones. Although Egypt is economically, socially and politically was in a poor state before Morsi came in power, many of these issues like economic depression, arbitrary treatments, abuses, corruptions or energy shortage were attributed to Morsi and his government, even though these
failings are widely attributed to Mubarak-regime loyalists in many parts of the state organizations.

The demonization of Morsi rule by the opponent parties and also by the media for legitimization of the military coup is one of the most widely discussed issues by Star writers. They think that the opponents and media systematically manipulated the perceptions of the people regarding Morsi rule and unfairly criticized and charged Morsi with deep economic depressions, unemployment, corruptions, energy shortages, despotic rule and Ihwanization of both the state and the society after only a single year of his rule. Star often asks what could be the fault of a just one-year president, having a weak cabinet and a dissolved parliament, that has made him deserve the military intervention. In such a short period of time, did he transform into a “dictator” more autocratic than Mubarak.

In addition, throughout July, Star Newspaper published so many news and analysis strongly condemned massacres by the armed forces of Egypt against Morsi proponents who were on the streets in order to attend the demonstrations against military coup and support Morsi. Furthermore, it is not surprising that there are much news supporting and encouraging the demonstrations by Morsi proponents.

The number of news, reports and columns disseminated by both newspapers give some idea about how looks each newspaper to the events during and after the military interventions in Egypt in July 2013. While Radikal published 8 columns and also 17 news reports or analysis on military coup throughout July 2013, Star on the other hand gave place 64 columns and 54 news reports or analysis. While 6 headlines or first page news in Radikal Newspaper was mentioning Egyptian military coup, there were 9 headlines in Star on military coup in Egypt. Unlike Star; the headlines, news reports and columns in Radikal were mostly just around the day military coup. On the other hand, there are many news reports and columns in Star spreading over the whole month.

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